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Abstract
Qualitative choice logic (QCL) is a propositional logic for representing alternative, ranked options
for problem solutions. The logic adds to classical propositional logic a new connective called ordered
disjunction: A × B intuitively means: if possible A, but if A is not possible then at least B. The
semantics of qualitative choice logic is based on a preference relation among models. Consequences
of QCL theories can be computed through a compilation to stratified knowledge bases which in turn
can be compiled to classical propositional theories. We also discuss potential applications of the
logic, several variants of QCL based on alternative inference relations, and their relation to existing
nonmonotonic formalisms.1
 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
For many AI applications, e.g., in design or configuration, it is necessary to represent
intended properties of a particular problem solution. For instance, if we want to book a
hotel for a trip to a conference, we intend properties such as being close to the conference
site, being close to potential sight-seeing objects, and we want the hotel reasonably priced.
Most often not all of the intended properties can be satisfied, that is, we have to make some
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sort of compromises. To do so it is very convenient to be able to express alternative, second
(or third, etc.) best options one would like to be satisfied if the best option is unavailable.
For the hotel booking example, for instance, we may want to express that we prefer to
stay within walking distance of the conference site; if that is not possible transportation
provided by the hotel should be available; if this is still not possible, we want at least
public transportation (taxis are not being reimbursed according to our university’s travel
refund policy).
To represent options of this kind we introduce in this paper a new nonmonotonic
propositional logic for representing qualitative choices—hence the name qualitative
choice logic (QCL). The logic is different from existing nonmonotonic logics in the
way nonmonotonicity is introduced: we do not use non-standard inference rules, as
in Reiter’s default logic [32], modal operators expressing consistency or belief, as in
autoepistemic logic [30], or abnormality predicates whose extensions are minimized, as
in circumscription [27,28]. The non-standard part of our logic is a new logical connective
× which is fully embedded in the logical language. Intuitively, if A and B are formulas
then A ×B says: if possible A, but if A is impossible then (at least) B .
The intended use of this logic can be illustrated using the hotel booking example.
Assume we want to represent the options concerning the location. Using mnemonic
variable names we express the options as follows:
walking × hotel-transport × public-transport.
Assume there are 4 hotels available out of which we have to pick one:
hotel1 ∨ hotel2 ∨ hotel3 ∨ hotel4.
We have the following information about the hotels
hotel1 → walking,
hotel2 → ¬walking ∧ hotel-transport,
hotel3 → ¬walking ∧ ¬hotel-transport ∧ public-transport,
hotel4 → ¬walking ∧ ¬hotel-transport ∧ ¬public-transport.
Given these propositional formulas QCL will give us the conclusion hotel1 since this is the
only hotel satisfying our most intended option. Now assume that, after calling the hotel we
find out that it is fully booked, that is, we have the additional information ¬hotel1. This
means that our most favoured property, being within walking distance of the conference
site, cannot be satisfied. We now obtain the conclusion hotel2 which is not exactly what we
wanted but better than nothing.
Our new connective × can be viewed as a kind of disjunction. Classical disjunction
allows us to represent alternatives. The new connective uses the order in which options are
written down to express additional preference information: A × B is very different form
B × A. We therefore call the connective ordered disjunction.
The semantics of the new logic will be defined in terms of preferred models. The
definition of preferred models will proceed in two steps:
(1) each formula of the logic leads to a ranking of models, based on how well the models
satisfy the formula,
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(2) a global preference relation on models is defined on the basis of the rankings given by
the single formulas.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we first introduce syntax and semantics
for QCL and give a few motivating examples. We then consider aspects of computation.
It turns out that the logic has a special normal form. Theories in this normal form can be
translated to stratified knowledge bases. These in turn can be transformed into a classical
propositional theory [5]. We thus can compute consequences of QCL through a compilation
process in which the formulas are first translated into propositional logic. Section 4
describes potential applications of QCL. In Section 5 we present several alternative
definitions of the consequence relation. In Section 6 we investigate the relationship
between QCL and circumscription, in Section 7 that between QCL and possibilistic logic.
Section 8 shows how QCL and Reiter’s default logic [32] can be combined. Section 9
discusses other related work and concludes the paper. Proofs of propositions are contained
in Appendix A.
2. Syntax and semantics of QCL
2.1. Syntax
We start with standard propositional logic and add a new non-standard kind of
disjunction: given formulas A1, . . . ,An2 we will use
A1 × · · · × An
to express: some Aj must be true, preferably A1, but if this is not possible then A2, if this is
not possible A3, etc. Since × is a binary operator, the formula should be read as shorthand
for (A1 × (· · · × An) · · ·)).3 The idea is that
• from A ×B you get A,
• from A ×B,¬A you get B , and
• A ×B,¬A,¬B is inconsistent.
Clearly, the order matters. We, therefore, call × ordered disjunction.
Ordered disjunction is fully embedded in the logical language to make sure that context
dependent options can be expressed, that is we may have formulas like A → (B ×C) and
¬A → (C ×B). The precise definition of the syntax is as follows:
Definition 1. Let V be a set of atoms. The set of well-formed formulas of QCL is
inductively defined as follows:
(1) every element of V is a well-formed formula,
2 Throughout the paper we use capital letters from the beginning of the alphabet to represent formulas.
3 We will later show that × is associative, so the brackets do not matter.
206 G. Brewka et al. / Artificial Intelligence 157 (2004) 203–237
(2) if F1 and F2 are well-formed formulas, then (¬F1), (F1 ∨F2), (F1 ∧F2) and (F1 ×F2)
are well-formed formulas.
As usual we use A → B as an abbreviation for ¬A∨B and A ↔ B as an abbreviation
for (A → B)∧(B → A).  represents a (classical) tautology, ⊥ a (classical) contradiction.
We omit unnecessary brackets assuming that all classical connectives have stronger
bindings than ×.
2.2. Semantics
The semantics of QCL is based on the degree of satisfaction of a formula in a particular
(classical) model. Intuitively, the degree can be viewed as a measure of disappointment:
the higher the degree the more disappointing the model (or the farther away from complete
satisfaction). As in standard propositional logic, an interpretation I is an assignment of
the classical truth values true and false to the atoms. We identify I with the subset of true
atoms.
Interpretations can satisfy formulas to a certain degree. For instance, if A and B are
atoms and I contains A then I satisfies the formula A × B as good as possible. If I does
not contain A but B , then it also satisfies A ×B , but only in a suboptimal way: the second
best option is now satisfied. We will say that a formula is satisfied to degree 1 if it is
satisfied as good as possible, to degree 2 if it is satisfied in the second best way, etc. For
classical formulas without ordered disjunction no suboptimal way of satisfaction exists.
Hence, such formulas can only be satisfied to degree 1 or not satisfied at all.
For formulas containing ordered disjunction let us first consider a simple special case.
Let F be a formula of the form
A1 × · · · × An
where each Ai is a classical propositional formula without × and n > 1. We will see later
that arbitrary QCL formulas can be equivalently transformed into formulas of this kind.
In this case the satisfaction degree of F in an interpretation I is simply the smallest k
such that I satisfies Ak . If none of the ordered disjuncts is satisfied, then also F is not
satisfied. More formally, using an index to express the degree of satisfaction, we define the
satisfaction relation for formulas of this type as (|= is classical propositional satisfaction):
I |=k (A1 × · · · ×An) iff
I |= (A1 ∨ · · · ∨ An) and k = min{j | I |= Aj }.
For arbitrary formulas determining the degree of disappointment is somewhat more
involved. Consider an ordered disjunction F = (F1 × F2) where F1 and F2 are complex
formulas containing ×. Assume that F1 is not satisfied by I , and that F2 is satisfied to
degree k. How do we determine the satisfaction degree for F in this case? This degree
depends on how many options or, in other words, possible satisfaction degrees F1 admits.
Assume there are j such options for F1 all of which are, as we said, not satisfied. The
satisfaction degree then will be j +k since F is satisfied in the (j +k)th best possible way.
We call the number of possible satisfaction degrees of a formula its optionality:
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Definition 2. The optionality of a formula is defined as follows:opt(A) = 1 if A is an atom,
opt(¬F) = 1,
opt(F1 ∨ F2) = max
(
opt(F1),opt(F2)
)
,
opt(F1 ∧ F2) = max
(
opt(F1),opt(F2)
)
,
opt(F1 × F2) = opt(F1) + opt(F2).
Intuitively, if the optionality of F is n, then there may be a best way, a second best way,
etc. and an nth best way of satisfying F . For classical formulas there is only one way to
satisfy them, hence they all have optionality 1.
The optionality of a negated formula may seem puzzling at first, but there is not more
than one way of making ¬(A × B) true: you must make A and B false, there is no
second best solution for this. In a sense negation transforms nested ordered disjunctions
into standard disjunctions. Hence ¬F behaves like a classical formula which explains
why opt(¬F) = 1.4 For conjunction and disjunction we obtain the maximum optionality
of the subformulas. For instance, if opt(F1) = j and opt(F2) = k with j < k, then an
interpretation which does not satisfy F1 but satisfies F2 to degree k will satisfy F1 ∨ F2 to
degree k. Similarly, an interpretation which does satisfy F1 to some degree and satisfies F2
to degree k will satisfy F1 ∧ F2 to degree k.
If F = A × B , where A and B are classical, 2 degrees are needed. The best way of
satisfying F is making A true, but if this does not work there is still the second best option,
namely making B true. This generalizes to the sum of optionalities if A and B are arbitrary
formulas. Note that for formulas of the form A1 × · · · × An where all Ai are classical the
optionality is n.
We now define the satisfaction relation. The relation is indexed according to the degree
of satisfaction of a formula in a model.
Definition 3.
(1) I |=k A iff k = 1 and A ∈ I (for propositional atoms A);
(2) I |=k P ∧ Q iff I |=m P and I |=n Q and k = max(m,n);
(3) I |=k P ∨ Q iff I |=m P or I |=n Q and k = min{r | I |=r P or I |=r Q};
(4) I |=k ¬P iff k = 1 and for no m: I |=m P ;
(5) I |=k P × Q iff I |=k P or [I |=1 ¬P , I |=m Q, and k = m+ opt(P )].
Let us illustrate the satisfiability relation using a simple example. Let F = A∨ (B ×C)
where A,B and C are atoms. Now all interpretations I containing A as well as those
containing B satisfy F with degree 1, that is, we have I |=1 F . Now assume I is an
interpretation which contains C but makes A and B false. In this case F is satisfied with
degree 2, that is I |=2 F . Interpretations satisfying none of the three atoms do not satisfy
F to any degree; they satisfy ¬F with degree 1.
4 As a consequence the formula ¬¬F is not equivalent to F , see Section 2.3.
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The use of optionalities in (5) can be illustrated using the formula
F = (walking × hotel-transport) × public-transport
Assume I |= public-transport, I 
|= walking and I 
|= hotel-transport. I satisfies public-
transport with degree 1. Since opt(walking × hotel-transport) = 2 we obtain satisfaction
degree 3 for F . This seems intuitive since the 3rd-best option is obtained.
The following lemmata can easily be proven by induction on the structure of formula F :
Lemma 1. I |=k F and I |=j F implies k = j .
We use degI (F ) to denote the satisfaction degree of F in interpretation I , that is
degI (F ) = k whenever I |=k F . If I |= ¬F we let degI (F ) = 0.
Lemma 2. I |=k F implies k  opt(F ).
The following proposition relates ordered and classical disjunction:
Proposition 1. Let F be a formula. There is a k such that I |=k F iff I |= F ∗ where F ∗ is
obtained from F by replacing each occurrence of × with standard disjunction.
Definition 4. Let T be a set of formulas. An interpretation I is a model of T if it satisfies
each formula in T to some degree.
The satisfaction degrees of formulas help us to determine preferred models. There are
different ways of doing this. We will use here a lexicographic ordering of models based on
the number of formulas satisfied to a particular degree. In Section 5 alternative preference
relations will be discussed. The lexicographic ordering is defined as follows:
Definition 5. Let Mk(T ) denote the subset of formulas of T satisfied by a model M
to degree k. A model M1 is T -preferred over a model M2 if there is a k such that
|Mk1 (T )| > |Mk2 (T )| and for all j < k: |Mj1 (T )| = |Mj2 (T )|. M is a preferred model of
T iff M is a maximally T -preferred model.
Intuitively, a preferred model of T is a model of T which satisfies the maximal number
of best options of choice logic formulas. Note that QCL is a conservative extension of
classical propositional logic: for a set of formulas T without appearance of × the preferred
models of T coincide with the classical models of T since all classical formulas must be
satisfied to degree 1.
We next define a consequence relation based on preferred models. We will restrict our
attention here to classical conclusions, that is, the consequence relation we are interested
in will be a relation between sets of formulas and classical formulas. The justification for
this restriction lies in the intended use of QCL: we want to be able to derive properties
describing a problem solution based on background knowledge, knowledge about the case
at hand and choice formulas describing intended properties. Classical formulas are the
formulas describing the intended problem solutions (e.g., the chosen hotel in the booking
example).
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Definition 6. Let T be a set of formulas, and let A be a classical formula. T |∼A iff A is
satisfied in all preferred models of T .
This inference relation is obviously nonmonotonic. As an example consider T = {A ×
B}. We have three models {A}, {A,B}, {B} with satisfaction degree 1, 1, 2, respectively.
This means that {A} and {A,B} are maximally preferred and we have A × B|∼A. If we
add ¬A then the single model, and thus the single preferred model, is {B}. We thus obtain
{A × B,¬A}|∼¬A and A is no longer a conclusion.
2.3. Properties of QCL
We first define a notion of equivalence:
Definition 7. Let F1,F2 be formulas. F1 is strongly equivalent to F2, denoted F1
.= F2, iff
opt(F1) = opt(F2) and for all interpretations I and integers k we have I |=k F1 iff I |=k F2.
The optionality of the formulas must be the same in order to guarantee that subformulas
can be replaced. For instance, although A ×A and A have the same satisfaction degree in
all interpretations, A ×B and A ×A × B clearly have not. Indeed, we have the following
substitution result:
Lemma 3. Let F(A) be a QCL formula containing a subformula A. Let F(B) be obtained
from F(A) by substitution of the formula B for an occurrence of A. If A .= B then
F(A)
.= F(B).
Note that for classical formulas without × all classical logical transformations can
be performed, but for those with × some standard transformations are not valid: if A is
classical, then ¬¬A is strongly equivalent to A, but ¬¬(A ×B) is not strongly equivalent
to A ×B due to the different optionalities of the formulas. Indeed, ¬¬(A ×B) is strongly
equivalent to A∨ B .
Another interesting feature of the logic is that conjunction and comma behave
differently: the QCL theory T1 = {F1,F2} must be distinguished from T2 = {F1 ∧ F2}.
For instance, if I1 |=1 F1 and I1 |=2 F2, whereas I2 |=2 F1 and I2 |=2 F2, then I1 is T1-
preferred over I2, but not T2-preferred. In our semantics, sets of formulas allow for more
fine-grained distinctions than the conjunction of these formulas.
Proposition 2. Ordered disjunction is associative, that is for arbitrary formulas F1,F2 and
F3 we have ((F1 × F2) × F3) .= (F1 × (F2 × F3)).
We now show that our inference relation satisfies properties usually considered intended
in nonmonotonic reasoning.
Proposition 3. The inference relation |∼ satisfies cautious monotony, that is, T |∼A and
T |∼B implies T ∪ {A}|∼B .
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Proposition 4. The inference relation |∼ satisfies cumulative transitivity, that is, T |∼A and
T ∪ {A}|∼B implies T |∼B .
In addition, we can show that |∼ is rational, in the sense that it satisfies all rules of
System P [21] as well as rational monotony [25]. This follows from the results of Section 3
and from the fact that lexicographic inference satisfies these rules as shown in [4].
3. Computation
In this section we investigate ways to compute consequences of QCL theories. The basic
idea is to take a set of arbitrary formulas T and to proceed in 3 steps:
(1) translate T to Norm(T ), a strongly equivalent normal form where all formulas
containing × are basic choice formulas (to be defined below),
(2) construct a stratified knowledge base Skb(Norm(T )) such that a classical formula F is
lexicographically entailed by Skb(Norm(T )) iff Norm(T )|∼F ,
(3) use the techniques developed in [5] to generate Extract(Skb(Norm(T ))), a classical
propositional knowledge base whose consequences are exactly the formulas lexico-
graphically entailed by Skb(Norm(T )).
From the equivalence results described in the next subsections the following proposition is
immediate:
Proposition 5. Let T be a consistent set of formulas.
T |∼A iff Extract(Skb(Norm(T )))  A.
3.1. Translation to normal form
We want to translate QCL bases into a normal form consisting only of classical formulas
and basic choice formulas which are defined as follows:
Definition 8. A formula F is a basic choice formula if it is of the form
A1 × · · · × An
where each Ai is a classical propositional formula and n > 1.
For the translation to normal form we need the following strong equivalences:
Proposition 6. Let Ai,Bj ,Ck, . . . be formulas without ×. Then the following strong
equivalences hold:
(1) (A1 × · · · ×An)∨ (B1 × · · · ×Bm) .= (C1 × · · · ×Ck) where k = max(m,n) and
Ci =
{
(Ai ∨Bi) if i min(m,n),
Ai if m< i  n, and
Bi if n < i m.
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Example:(A1 ×A2)∨ (B1 ×B2 × B3) .= (A1 ∨B1) × (A2 ∨B2) ×B3.
(2) (A1 × · · · ×An)∧ (B1 × · · · ×Bm) .= (C1 × · · · ×Ck) where k = max(m,n) and
Ci =
{ [(A1 ∨ · · · ∨Ai)∧Bi ] ∨ [Ai ∧ (B1 ∨ · · · ∨ Bi)] if i min(m,n),
[(A1 ∨ · · · ∨An)∧ Bi] if n < i m,
[Ai ∧ (B1 ∨ · · · ∨Bm)] if m< i  n.
Example:
(A1 ×A2)∧ (B1 ×B2 × B3)
.= (A1 ∧B1) ×
[
(A1 ∨A2)∧B2
]∨ [A2 ∧ (B1 ∨B2)] × [(A1 ∨ A2)∧B3].
(3) ¬(A1 × · · · ×An) .= ¬(A1 ∨ · · · ∨An).
Repeated application of these transformation rules moves × outside (or eliminates it)
until we obtain a classical formula or a basic choice formula:5
Proposition 7. Every formula F can be translated to a strongly equivalent formula F ′
which is either classical or a basic choice formula.
We next show how QCL bases in normal form can be translated to stratified knowledge
bases. For the results of the following section we need an additional condition: we say
a set T of formulas is standardized iff different basic choice formulas do not possess
syntactically identical prefixes6 (they may, of course, be logically equivalent). This
condition considerably simplifies the discussion in the next subsection where we will
construct certain sets of prefixes of formulas. In our cardinality based approach it is
important to distinguish prefixes coming from different formulas. Without standardization
we would have to deal with multi-sets rather than ordinary sets in the following definitions.
Of course, any theory T can be transformed into standardized form. This can simply be
achieved by replacing identical formulas with some logically equivalent but syntactically
different formulas. For instance, a standardized form of T = {A × B,A × C} can be
{A∧ A × B,A ×C}.
A set of QCL formulas T is in normal form if it consists of classical or basic choice
formulas only, and if it is standardized.
5 Due to (2), our translation as it stands is exponential. Jérôme Lang (personal communication) has pointed
out that a quadratic translation exists. Each QCL formula F1 × · · · × Fn is equivalent to F1 × (F1 ∨F2) × · · · ×
(F1 ∨· · · ∨Fn). This transformation (with quadratic increase in size) needs to be done only once in the beginning.
Then, under the assumption that F1 × F2 implies F1 |= F2, we can reformulate the translation of a conjunction
of ordered disjunctions as follows: (A1 × · · · ×An)∧ (B1 × · · · ×Bm) .= (C1 × · · · ×Ck) where k = max(m,n)
and Ci = (Ai ∧Bi ) if i min(m,n), Ci = (An ∧Bi) if n < i m, and Ci = (Ai ∧Bm) if m < i  n. The total
increase in size is quadratic.
6 A1 × · · · ×Ak is a prefix of A1 × · · · ×An whenever k  n.
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3.2. Compilation to a stratified knowledge baseWe recall the definition of a stratified knowledge base.
Definition 9. A stratified knowledge base is a sequence (K,S1, . . . , Sn) of sets of classical
propositional formulas.
Since we need K to be a non-default level we slightly modify the definition of
lexicographically preferred subbases from [1,24].
Definition 10. Let KB = (K,S1, . . . , Sn) be a stratified knowledge base. A maximal
consistent subset S of (K ∪ S1 ∪ · · · ∪ Sn) is a lexicographically preferred subbase of KB
iff
(1) K ⊆ S, and
(2) if S′ is a maximal consistent subset of (K ∪ S1 ∪ · · · ∪ Sn) containing K and for some
k ∈ {1, . . . , n}: |S′ ∩ Sk| > |S ∩ Sk| then there is j < k such that |S ∩ Sj | > |S′ ∩ Sj |.
The only difference between this definition and the original one [1,24] is that there is
no lexicographically preferred subbase if K is inconsistent.
Definition 11. Let KB = (K,S1, . . . , Sn) be a stratified knowledge base. A formula
F is lexicographically entailed by KB, denoted KB lex F , iff F is entailed by all
lexicographically preferred subbases of KB.
We now define the translation:
Definition 12. Let T be a QCL base in normal form. The stratified knowledge base
associated with T , denoted Skb(T ), is
Skb(T ) = (T ∗, T1, . . . , Tn)
where n = max{k | F ∈ T ,opt(F ) = k} − 1, T ∗ is obtained from T by replacing each
occurrence of × by ∨, and
Ti = {A1 ∨ · · · ∨Ai | 1 i < k,A1 × · · · ×Ak ∈ T }.
The translation is obviously polynomial in time and size.
Proposition 8. T |∼F iff Skb(T ) lex F .
Note that in the definition of Ti the case i = k is not needed since the corresponding
disjunctions are already in T ∗. It turns out that there is a second, equivalent translation. In
Definition 12 we can equivalently define
Ti = {¬A1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Ai−1 ∧Ai | 1 i < k,A1 × · · · ×Ak ∈ T }.
G. Brewka et al. / Artificial Intelligence 157 (2004) 203–237 213
To illustrate the translation consider the hotel example given in the introduction (after
¬hotel1 was learned). The stratified knowledge base associated with T is Skb(T ) =
(T ∗, T1, T2) where T ∗ consists of:
¬hotel1,
walking ∨ hotel-transport ∨ public-transport,
hotel1 ∨ hotel2 ∨ hotel3 ∨ hotel4,
hotel1 → walking,
hotel2 → ¬walking ∧ hotel-transport,
hotel3 → ¬walking ∧ ¬hotel-transport ∧ public-transport,
hotel4 → ¬walking ∧ ¬hotel-transport ∧ ¬public-transport,
and
T1 = {walking},
T2 = {walking ∨ hotel-transport}.
There is exactly one lexicographically preferred subbase, namely T ∗ ∪ T2. We thus have
Skb(T ) lex hotel2
as intended.
Note that a translation also exists in the opposite direction: we can translate a stratified
knowledge base KB = (K,S1, . . . , Sn) to a QCL-theory T . T contains K , and for each
formula F ∈ Si the formula ⊥ × · · · × ⊥ × F ×  with i occurrences of ⊥.
3.3. Compilation to a classical KB
This step is described in [5]. To make this paper somewhat more self-contained
we briefly describe the main idea underlying the compilation. Lexicographic entailment
from the original base is replaced by classical entailment from a compiled base, which
contains either formulas from the original base or formulas subsumed by the original
ones, obtained from the disjunction of some of the original formulas. This idea has
several implementations, namely Disjunctive Maxi-Adjustment (DMA), Iterative DMA
and Whole-DMA, which produce logically equivalent results but with different spatial and
computational needs.
• DMA replaces formulas involved in a conflict by disjunctions that restore consistency
involving a minimum of these formulas (if any). Here the conflicting formulas are only
computed once.
• Iterative DMA only adds pairwise disjunctions to the KB and iterates the detection
of conflicting formulas in order to stay as close as possible to the original KB.
Unfortunately, the approach is computationally costly since determining formulas
involved in a conflict is on the second level of the polynomial hierarchy in complexity
theory.
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• In contrast, Whole-DMA does not detect formulas involved in conflicts, but works
with disjunctions built from all the formulas. The advantage is that the complexity of
the approach is on the first level of the polynomial hierarchy (SAT), and that in practice
SAT solvers are now able to solve instances of the problem with several thousands of
variables. The disadvantage is that the size of the compiled KB is likely to explode
exponentially.
Note that for the hotel example discussed above the three approaches yield the classical
knowledge base T ∗ ∪ {walking ∨ hotel-transport}.
For the details we refer to [5].
4. Applications
Qualitative choice logic has a number of possible applications.
• In design and configuration, intended properties can be described and ranked according
to their desirability.
• In agent systems, intended actions to be performed by agents can be specified together
with backup actions covering situations where the standard actions are inappropriate.
• In database and web applications, prioritized queries can be expressed which describe
suboptimal results. For instance, one may start a query like: find a used convertible
less than 2 years old in red, if red is unavailable then in black. This may be very useful
for e-commerce applications.
We will focus on configuration and prioritized queries in this paper.
The configuration task can informally be described as follows: given a set of
components Comp determine a set C ⊆ Comp such that C is a complete solution (no
necessary component is lacking), contains no unnecessary elements, and satisfies certain
requirements depending on the case at hand as much as possible. More precisely the
following pieces of information are relevant:
• A description of the available components which can be chosen for a particular
configuration or subconfiguration.
• A description of additional components which are necessary if some compo-
nent/subconfiguration is chosen.
• A description of the properties of the components.
• A description of the particular configuration task at hand.
• A description of the desired properties respectively intended components.
Let us illustrate this using a trip planning example. The available main options are going
by plane, by train or by car. If plane is chosen it is necessary to organize transportation to
and from the airport. If train is chosen one has to get to the station and from the station to
the final destination. For both cases taxis and buses are available. Here is a formalization
of this information. It is convenient to use exclusive or (⊗) in configuration examples.
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trip ↔ plane ⊗ train ⊗ car,
¬plane ∨ ¬train ∨ ¬car,
train ↔ toStation,
train ↔ fromStation,
plane ↔ toAirport,
plane ↔ fromAirport,
toStation ↔ taxi-toStation ⊗ bus-toStation,
fromStation ↔ taxi-fromStation ⊗ bus-fromStation,
toAirport ↔ taxi-toAirport ⊗ bus-toAirport,
fromAirport ↔ taxi-fromAirport ⊗ bus-fromAirport.
Note that we use ↔ rather than → to describe the available alternatives. This is necessary
to make sure that a component is contained in a configuration only if it is necessary.7
We next describe our preferences. For short trips we prefer car over train, for medium
trips train over car. We never use the plane for such trips. Also, if we have heavy luggage
we never take the train. For long distance trips our first preference is plane, followed by
train and car. We also need to represent the background knowledge that a trip belongs to
exactly one of the three categories:
short → car × train,
medium → train × car,
long → flight × train × car,
luggage → ¬train,
short ⊗ medium ⊗ long,
¬short ∨ ¬medium ∨ ¬long.
The preferences for traveling to and from the airport, respectively station, are as follows:
toStation → taxi-toStation × bus-toStation,
fromStation → taxi-fromStation × bus-fromStation,
toAirport → bus-toAirport × taxi-toAirport,
fromAirport → bus-fromAirport × taxi-fromAirport.
Now given a description of the trip to be planned and the relevant requirements we obtain a
suitable configuration. For instance, if in addition to the formulas above we have trip, short
then the preferred model contains car and no other component. If we have trip, short, ¬car
we get taxi-toStation, train, taxi-fromStation. In each case we obtain a configuration which
best satisfies our preferences.
7 The second formula is necessary because plane ⊗ train ⊗ car is true also if all three alternatives are true.
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The next example involves prioritized queries. Assume a database DB of certain items,
say cars, with a description of their properties is given:
car1 → BMW ∧ red ∧ ¬convertible,
car2 → BMW ∧ green ∧ convertible,
car3 → VW ∧ blue ∧ ¬convertible,
car4 → VW ∧ blue ∧ convertible.
We assume DB also contains background knowledge of the kind
BMW → ¬VW, red → ¬blue, red → ¬green,
etc. together with information that exactly one car is to be chosen:
car1 ∨ car2 ∨ · · ·
and the formulas {cari → ¬carj | i < j }. Now a prioritized query is just a set of QCL
formulas Q. An answer Ans is a disjunction of items such that DB ∪ Q|∼Ans. In the
example we might have
Q = {red × blue, convertible × ¬convertible}.
This query would lead to the answer car1 ∨ car4. car1 is contained in the answer since it
has the most preferred colour, car4 since it is a convertible. If we add to Q the formula
BMW × VW the answer becomes car1.
Note that since the preference relation on models depends on the number of formulas
satisfied to a particular degree we can give more weight to a particular criterion by adding
a syntactic variant of a formula in Q. Again, syntactic variants are needed to avoid the use
of multi-sets of formulas. For instance, if we add (red ∧ ) × blue to our original query
then the colour criterion becomes more important since colour counts twice and we obtain
the answer BMW . This does not exclude blue cars from being answers in case no red car is
available.
5. Alternative definitions of entailment
In Section 2 we defined entailment for QCL in terms of a lexicographic ordering on
models, based on the number of formulas satisfied to a certain degree. This leads to an
approach where solutions are preferred when they contain the highest number of most
preferred options. For instance, if there are three choices with three options each, say
A1 ×A2 × A3, B1 ×B2 ×B3, C1 × C2 ×C3
then a model M1 satisfying A1,B1 and C3 is preferred over a model M2 satisfying A2,B2
and C1 because the number of formulas satisfied in M1 with degree 1 is 2, the number in
M2 is 1. This may not be wanted for all applications. In our example we might consider M2
a reasonable alternative: although it gives us only one best choice, we still get two second
best options.
In this section we will discuss alternative ways to define preferences on models based
on the satisfaction degrees of the premises.
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5.1. Inclusion based preferenceThe following strengthening of the preference relation is based on subsets rather than
the number of formulas satisfied with a particular degree.
Definition 13. Let Mk(T ) denote the set of formulas of T satisfied by a model M of T to
degree k. A model M1 of T is T -inclusion-preferred over a model M2 if there is a k such
that Mk1 (T ) is a strict superset of M
k
2 (T ) and for all j < k: M
j
1 (T ) = Mj2 (T ).
Note that inclusion preference implies the cardinality based preference introduced
earlier but not vice versa. In the example above, M1 is not inclusion-preferred over M2.
We therefore get in general more maximally inclusion-preferred models and thus fewer
conclusions, that is, the inference relation |∼inc (defined as T |∼incF iff F is true in all
inclusion preferred models of T ) is more cautious than |∼.
It turns out that a result corresponding to Proposition 8 can be established for inclusion
based preference using the same translation. The definition of an inclusion preferred
subbase of a stratified knowledge base is obtained from Definition 10 by replacing clause 2
with
if S′ is a maximal consistent subset of (K ∪ S1 ∪ · · · ∪ Sn) containing K and for some
k ∈ {1, . . . , n}: S ∩ Sk is a proper subset of S′ ∩ Sk then there is j < k such that S′ ∩ Sj
is a proper subset of S ∩ Sj .
We have the following proposition:
Proposition 9. T |∼incF iff Skb(T ) inc F .
A recent complexity result from Coste-Marquis and Marquis [14] is relevant here:
they prove that there is no way to compile any stratified knowledge base under inclusion
preference in polynomial space whereas such a translation is possible under lexicographic
preference by adding new propositional variables (the compiled base is “query equivalent”
to the original one). This is an additional argument in favour of lexicographic preference.
5.2. Preference based on ranking functions
Another possibility for defining preferred models is to use ranking functions. Ranking
functions assign an integer rank to a model M of a set of formulas
T = {f1, . . . , fn}
based on the vector of satisfaction degrees(
degM(f1), . . . ,degM(fn)
)
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of the formulas in T .8 More precisely, let  be a function from a vector of integers to an
integer.  will be called a ranking function if it satisfies the following requirements:
Unanimity: If ∀i = 1, . . . , n, ji  ki then: (j1, . . . , jn)(k1, . . . , kn).
Model preservation: (j1, . . . , jn) = 0 iff ji = 0 for some i = 1, . . . , n.
Intuitively, the second requirement means that a given interpretation should not be
considered as a model of T if and only if it falsifies some formula of T . Ranking functions
induce preferences on models in a straightforward way:
Definition 14. Let T = {f1, . . . , fn} be a set of QCL formulas,  a ranking function.
A model M1 of T is a -preferred model of T iff there is no model M2 of T such that
(degM2(f1), . . . ,degM2(fn)) < (degM1(f1), . . . ,degM1(fn)).
The inference relation induced by this preference relation will be denoted |∼.
As an example consider the ranking function
(j1, . . . , jn) =
{0 if jk = 0 for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n},∑
1kn jk otherwise.
This ranking function just adds up the degrees of (dis)satisfaction of all formulas in T
for each model and prefers those models whose sum is minimal, that is, whose overall
dissatisfaction is minimal. In the example from the beginning of this section, both M1 and
M2 have overall degree 5 (1 + 1 + 3 and 2 + 2 + 1, respectively), thus none of the models
is preferred to the other.
Even more fine grained distinctions could be introduced by adding to each option in an
ordered disjunction some integer (increasing in value from left to right) which could be
used as a kind of penalty to compute the overall dissatisfaction degree of models.
The relationship between preference based on ranking functions and possibilistic logic
will be further investigated in Section 7.
6. Relation to circumscription
Since its invention in the seventies, circumscription [26–28] was certainly one of
the most influential nonmonotonic formalisms. In the first order case, circumscription
allows the extensions of certain predicates to be minimized. Propositional circumscription
makes certain atoms false whenever possible. Semantically, this is achieved by defining a
preference relation on models and reasoning from most preferred models. The preference
relation depends on the predicates, respectively atoms, chosen for minimization.
Since QCL is a propositional logic, we consider propositional circumscription for
the comparison in this section. Let us first discuss a short example. According to the
8 For the reader’s convenience we recall the definition of degM given after Lemma 1: degM(f ) = k iff
M |=k f and degM(f )= 0 iff M |=1 ¬f .
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methodology proposed by McCarthy, defaults can be represented using ab atoms which
are then circumscribed. For instance, circumscribing ab1 in
(1) penguin ∧ ¬ab1 → ¬flies,
(2) penguin,
yields the conclusion ¬flies. In QCL there is a simple way to model this: we just have to
add
¬ab1 × ab1
and obtain exactly the same conclusions.
For our formal result we will consider one of the most general forms of circumscription,
prioritized circumscription with fixed atoms. The priorities are used to handle potential
conflicts between minimized atoms, the fixed atoms are not allowed to vary during the
minimization.
Assume that, in addition to formulas (1) and (2), we have
(3) bird ∧ ¬ab2 → flies,
(4) bird.
Minimizing the two ab-atoms now yields two minimal models. Intuitively, we would
expect (1) to be preferred over (3) for reasons of specificity. In circumscription this can
be achieved by minimizing ab1 with higher priority than ab2. This can be modeled in QCL
by adding to the four premises the formulas
¬ab1 × ab1,
⊥ × ¬ab2 × ab2.
Adding an unsatisfiable option to the first choice formula has the desired effect: making
ab1 false is more important than making ab2 false.
It is also not difficult to handle fixed atoms. Assume b is fixed. We have to make sure
that models which differ in the truth value of b become incomparable. If inclusion based
preference is used this can be achieved by adding:
¬b × b,
b × ¬b.
Here are the formal definitions needed for our result:
Definition 15. Let T be a propositional theory, V1, . . . , Vn sets of atoms to be circum-
scribed, W a set of fixed atoms such that (V1 ∪ · · · ∪ Vn) ∩ W = ∅. A formula F is a
consequence of the prioritized circumscription of V1, . . . , Vn in T with fixed W , denoted
Circ(T ;V1, . . . , Vn;W) |= F , iff F is true in all <V1,...,Vn;W -preferred models of T , where
M1 <V1,...,Vn;W M2 iff9
9 As usual, we identify models with the set of their true atoms.
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(1) there is i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that M1 ∩ Vi ⊂ M2 ∩ Vi , and for all j < i: M1 ∩ Vj =
M2 ∩ Vj , and
(2) M1 ∩W = M2 ∩W .
Since the preference criterion used for circumscription is based on subsets, the inclusion
based variant of QCL is the natural candidate to capture circumscription. Indeed, we have
the following proposition:
Proposition 10. Let T be a propositional theory, V1, . . . , Vn sets of atoms to be
circumscribed, W a set of fixed atoms such that (V1 ∪ · · · ∪ Vn)∩W = ∅. Circ(T ;V1, . . . ,
Vn;W) |= F iff T ′|∼incF where
T ′ = T ∪ {⊥ × · · · × ⊥ × ¬v × v | v ∈ Vi,⊥ appears i − 1 times}
∪ {v × ¬v | v ∈ W }
∪ {¬v × v | v ∈ W }.
We have seen that QCL can quite easily capture propositional circumscription. How
about the converse? Of course, since circumscription by definition is a minimization
technique whereas QCL allows us to specify arbitrary preferences we cannot expect
modular translations from QCL to circumscription which give us exactly the same
preferred models.10 However, if we admit additional symbols in the language we can use
circumscription to generate models corresponding to the inclusion preferred QCL models
up to the additional atoms.
We assume that all QCL formulas are in normal form, i.e., of the form Fj = A1 ×
· · · ×An. Using additional abnormality atoms this formula can be represented as the set of
formulas:
(1) ¬abj,1 → A1,
(2) abj,1 ∧ ¬abj,2 → A2,
...
(n − 1) abj,1 ∧ · · · ∧ abj,n−2 ∧ ¬abj,n−1 → An−1,
(n) abj,1 ∧ · · · ∧ abj,n−1 → An.
To translate a formula of optionality n in normal form we thus need n − 1 new ab-atoms
not appearing anywhere else in the premises and in the translation of other formulas, and
we generate n implications as illustrated above. Intuitively, abj,i says: option i of formula
j is impossible. We have the following result:
Proposition 11. Let T = {F1,F2, . . .} be a set of QCL formulas in normal form and
n = max{j | Fi ∈ T , opt(Fi) = j }−1. Let T ′ be the translation of T , and for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
10 A translation Trans is modular iff for arbitrary sets S,S′ we have Trans(S ∪ S′)= Trans(S)∪ Trans(S′).
G. Brewka et al. / Artificial Intelligence 157 (2004) 203–237 221
let ABi = {abj,i | Fj ∈ T } the set of newly introduced abnormality atoms with second index
i . Moreover, let F be a formula not containing any atom in AB1 ∪ · · · ∪ ABn. Then
T |∼incF iff Circ(T ′;AB1, . . . ,ABn; ∅) |= F.
This result shows that in principle prioritized circumscription is able to express QCL
under inclusion based preference. However, for each formula with optionality n we need
n − 1 new abnormality atoms, and the representation is quadratic in the size of the
original QCL theory. We also consider it as an advantage that in QCL the knowledge is
completely represented by means of formulas whereas circumscription needs the additional
specification of a circumscription policy. Moreover, QCL offers alternative preference
criteria which are not captured by standard versions of circumscription.11
7. Possibilistic logic and QCL
In Section 5 several alternative definitions of entailment have been proposed. Among
them, we defined preferred models based on ranking functions . This section investigates
relationships between possibilistic logic and a class of QCL based on ranking functions
. In particular, we show that (i) any basic choice logic formula can be viewed as a
possibilistic knowledge base, and (ii) for each ranking function , the entailment |∼
can be recovered in a possibility theory framework. A corollary of this result is that, for
any ranking function, any QCL theory can be equivalently transformed into a basic choice
logic formula. The following first provides a brief reminder on possibilistic logic.
7.1. A brief reminder on possibilistic logic
7.1.1. Guaranteed possibilistic knowledge bases
Possibilistic logic provides a tool for performing uncertainty reasoning, where uncertain
information is semantically represented by means of possibility distributions. Possibility
distributions are means to rank order different interpretations of a language. More precisely,
a possibility distribution, denoted by π , is a function from a set of mutually exclusive
situations (solutions or interpretations) to the interval [0,1]. By convention π(I) = 1
means that I is among the most normal (or preferred) situations, π(I) = 0 means
that I is impossible or excluded as a possible solution. More generally, π(I)  π(I ′)
means that I is at least as preferred as I ′. There are several compact (or syntactic)
encodings of possibility distributions [2]: necessity based knowledge bases, min-based
possibilistic graphs, product-based possibilistic graphs, etc. Recently, another type of
compact representation, called guaranteed possibilistic knowledge bases or simply ∆-
knowledge bases, has been investigated [3,16]. It is based on the notion of guaranteed
possibility measures, which are defined on formulas from a possibility distribution π in
the following way:
∆(φ) = min{π(I) | I |= φ}.
11 For a cardinality based treatment of circumscription see [29].
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A ∆-knowledge base is composed of a set of weighted formulas of the form [φi,αi ], where
φi denotes a propositional formula, and αi is a real number between 0 and 1. The pair
[φi,αi ] means that any model of φi is satisfactory to a degree at least equal to αi , namely:
∆(φi) αi
or
(1) ∀I |= φi, π(I) αi .
Definition 16. Each ∆-knowledge base ∆ induces a unique possibility distribution π
defined by:
∀I, π(I) =
{
0 iff I falsifies all formulas of ∆,
max{αi | [φi,αi ] ∈ ∆,I |= φi} otherwise.
In [16] it has been shown that this possibility distribution corresponds to the most
specific possibility distribution12 satisfying (1) for each weighted formula in ∆. As
we will show later, any basic choice logic formula can be equivalently represented by
a ∆-knowledge base. However, in order to show the encoding of a set basic choice
logic formulas, we need to use possibilistic fusion operators which are recalled in next
subsection.
7.1.2. Possibilistic fusion
In [3] several possibilistic fusion operators have been proposed to merge a set ∆-
knowledge bases. In this section we restrict the class of merging operators to those
which are useful for establishing relationships between QCL and possibilistic logic. More
precisely, let ⊕ be a function from a vector of real numbers in [0,1] to a real number
between [0,1]. ⊕ will be called a [0,1]-based merging operator. The requirements for ⊕
are similar to those defined for  in Section 5.2:
Unanimity: If ∀i = 1, . . . , n,αi  α′i then: ⊕(α1, . . . , αn)⊕(α′1, . . . , α′n).
Model preservation: ⊕(α1, . . . , αn) = 0 iff αi = 0 for some i = 1, . . . , n.
The second requirement is stronger than the one used in [3] which simply requires that
⊕(0, . . . ,0) = 0. It is strengthened here in order to have an easier connection with QCL. Let
∆1, . . . ,∆n be the ∆-knowledge bases to merge. We denote by [φij , αij ] the j th weighted
formula in ∆i .
Definition 17. The result of merging ∆1, . . . ,∆n, denoted by ∆⊕, is defined as
∆⊕ =
{[φ1i ∧ · · · ∧ φnk,⊕(α1i , . . . , αnk)] | [φ1i, α1i] ∈ ∆1, . . . , [φnk,αnk] ∈ ∆n}.
It can be checked that the possibility distribution associated to ∆⊕ using the above
definition can be characterized as follows:
12 π is said to be more specific than π ′, if ∀I,π(I ) π ′(I ).
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Lemma 4. Let ∆1, . . . ,∆n be a set of ∆-knowledge bases. Let π1, . . . , πn be their as-
sociated possibility distributions, respectively. Let ⊕ be a [0,1]-based merging oper-
ator, and ∆⊕ be the ∆-knowledge base given by Definition 17. Then ∀I,π∆⊕(I) =
⊕(π1(I), . . . , πn(I)).
7.2. Encoding ranking functions-based QCL in possibilistic logic
We restrict ourselves to sets of basic choice formulas. This is not a limitation since
a classical propositional formula p can be represented as a basic choice formula p × ⊥
without changing the ranking of interpretations. The following lemma is immediate,
noticing that models of {pi × ⊥ | pi is a classical formula of T } are exactly the same
as the ones of {pi | pi is a classical formula of T }.
Lemma 5. Let T be a set of formulas. Let T ′ be obtained from T by replacing each
classical formula p in T by a new basic choice formula p × ⊥. Then T and T ′ induce
the same ranking on the set of interpretations.
The following lemma establishes a first connection between QCL and possibilistic logic
when we only have one basic choice formula.
Lemma 6. Let F = A1 × · · · ×An be a basic choice formula. Let αi = εi for i = 1, . . . , n,
where 0 < ε < 1.13 Let ∆ = {[A1, α1], . . . , [An,αn]} be the ∆-knowledge base associated
to F . Then ∀I, I |=k F if and only if π(I) = αk and I |=1 ¬F iff π(I) = 0.
Hence, each basic choice logic formula can be represented by a ∆-knowledge base. As
a corollary of Lemmas 4 and 6, it is possible to provide a possibilistic encoding of a general
QCL theory:
Lemma 7. Let T = {F1, . . . ,Fn} be a QCL theory, and let  be a ranking function. Let
us again denote by αi = εi for i ∈ ℵ. Let ∆i be the ∆-knowledge base associated with Fi
using Lemma 6. Then the ∆-knowledge base associated with T is the one obtained from
Definition 17 by merging ∆i ’s with ⊕(αi , . . . , αk) = ε(i,...,k).
Lemma 7 is interesting since it means that, for any ranking function , any QCL theory
can be transformed into one basic choice formula. Indeed, let T = {F1, . . . ,Fn} be a set
of basic choice formulas. Again, we denote by Aij the propositional formula which is in
position j (namely after j −1 occurrences of ×) in the basic choice formula Fi . We denote
by
C = A1i ∧ · · · ∧ Ank
any conjunction of exactly one Aij from each Fi . C is called a complex cube. We denote by
degree(C) the rank associated to C defined as equal to (i, . . . , k). Then, it can be checked
13 In fact, any function such that αi > αj if and only if i < j is appropriate.
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that for each ranking function , it is possible to replace T by one basic choice formula
defined as B1 × · · · ×Bm where:
m = (opt(F1), . . . ,opt(Fn)),
and
Bi =
{⊥ if there is no C such that degree(C) = i,∨
degree(C)=i C otherwise.
Example 1. Let us assume that T is composed of two basic choice formulas F1 =
A11 ×A12 and F2 = A21 ×A22. Then we have 4 complex cubes:
A11 ∧A21, A11 ∧ A22, A12 ∧ A21, A12 ∧A22.
Let us assume that the ranking function  yields the sum of the satisfaction degrees of the
single formulas (as described in Section 5.2). Then, we have:
degree(A11 ∧A21) = 2,
degree(A11 ∧A22) = 3,
degree(A12 ∧A21) = 3,
degree(A12 ∧A22) = 4.
Therefore, it can be checked that if we rank-order interpretations with respect to sum of
degree then this ranking can be recovered from the basic choice formula C1 ×C2 ×C3 ×C4
with:
C1 =⊥,
C2 = A11 ∧A21,
C3 = (A12 ∧ A21)∨ (A12 ∧A21), and
C4 = A12 ∧A22.
8. Combining QCL and default logic
QCL allows us to specify preferences and to reason from most preferred models. So
far, we haven’t said much about the very nature of the preferences. A model M1 may be
preferred to another model M2 because it better satisfies some desires, intentions or norms.
But it may also be preferred because it describes more normal states of the world, in other
words, because it is more in accordance with our expectations about what is true in the
world.
In situations where different types of preferences play a role, e.g., desires as well as
default information, it may be useful to have different formal tools available to represent
them. In this section we discuss how QCL and Reiter’s default logic [32], one of the
standard logics for representing defeasible information, can be combined. The motivation
for this section is twofold: (1) we want to show that ordered disjunction cannot only be
introduced in classical propositional logic, but also in a non-classical logic, and (2) we
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want to propose a formalism where the mechanisms of default logic are used to determine
what is normally the case, in other words, what is expected to be true, and the mechanisms
of QCL to determine what is desired to be true. We assume some familiarity with default
logic and refer the reader to Reiter’s original paper for more details.
In Reiter’s approach a default theory (D,W) is a pair consisting of a set of classical
formulas W representing what is known to be true and a set of default rules D. Default
theories induce extensions which can be viewed as sets of acceptable beliefs a reasoner
may adopt based on the default theory. The extensions are logically closed supersets of
W which are closed under the default rules and contain only formulas possessing a non-
circular derivation. A (propositional) default rule is of the form A : B1, . . . ,Bn/C where
A, the prerequisite, Bi , the consistency conditions, and C, the consequent (also called head
of the default rule), are formulas. The rule is applicable with respect to a set of formulas S
iff A ∈ S and for no i ∈ {1, . . . , n} ¬Bi ∈ S.
We will extend default logic in two ways: we will admit ordered disjunction in W and
in the head of default rules. This will allow us to represent desires in W and to derive
preferences by default. The general principle is the same as in QCL, but instead of preferred
models of the premises we have to consider preferred models of extensions. To define
the preference relation between models a satisfaction degree of default rules needs to be
defined.
Definition 18. A (propositional) choice default theory is a pair (D,W), where W is a set
of QCL formulas and D is a set of rules of the form A : B1, . . . ,Bn/C where A and the Bi
are classical formulas, C is a QCL formula.
To define extensions we will simply consider the default theories obtained by replacing
ordered disjunction with ordinary disjunction:
Definition 19. Let ∆ = (D,W) be a choice default theory. E is an extension of ∆ iff E
is an extension of (D∗,W∗) where D∗ and W∗ are the propositional counterparts of D,
respectively W , obtained by replacing ordered disjunction with ordinary disjunction.
Ordered disjunction is now used to determine the most preferred models of extensions.
We will use Ext(∆) to denote the set of extensions of ∆. To compare the models of
extensions we have to define a satisfaction degree not only for formulas, but also for the
rules in D. The satisfaction degree of a rule will not only depend on the satisfaction degree
of its consequent, but also on the applicability of the rule within the extension. Since there
is no need to punish a rule for being inapplicable we will say that a rule is satisfied to the
best possible degree 1 whenever its prerequisite is underivable or one of its consistency
conditions is violated.
Definition 20. Let E be an extension of a choice default theory (D,W), M a model of
E and r = A : B1, . . . ,Bn/C a rule in D. The E-satisfaction degree of r in M , denoted
degME (r), is defined as follows:
degME (r) =
{
1 if A /∈ E or ¬Bi ∈ E for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
degM(C) otherwise.
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Here degM(C) denotes the degree of satisfaction of C in M . degM(r) is well-definedE
since the consequent of an applicable rule must be in the extension. M must therefore be a
model of C.
The definition of the satisfaction degree of a QCL formula in a model is independent of
a particular extension and remains unchanged. Given the satisfaction degrees of rules and
formulas, we can define a preference ordering on the models of an extension E using any
of the methods discussed earlier for QCL. For instance, in the cardinality based approach
we can count the formulas in W and rules in D satisfied to a certain degree, etc.
Assume a preference ordering on the models of each extension E is fixed that way. Let
Pref (E) denote the maximally preferred models of E based on this ordering.
Definition 21. A formula F is a consequence of a choice default theory ∆ = (D,W) iff F
is true in each model of the set
⋃
E∈Ext(∆) Pref (E).
This definition generalizes both QCL and default logic (under sceptical inference): if
D = ∅ the consequences coincide with the QCL consequences of W , and if the default
theory does not contain ordered disjunction then the consequences are the formulas
contained in all extensions.
Here is a small example illustrating what can be expressed in choice default logic.
Assume you prefer having a Porsche over having a BMW over having a VW, but you
also know that you cannot have an expensive car, and that normally a Porsche is expensive.
Moreover, you prefer a convertible, unless you live in Germany where it rains quite often:
have(Porsche) × have(BMW) × have(VW),
expensive(Porsche) → ¬have(Porsche),
true : expensive(Porsche)/expensive(Porsche),
true : ¬residence(Germany)/convertible × ¬convertible.
The single extension contains expensive(Porsche) and thus ¬have(Porsche). Indepen-
dently of whether a cardinality or an inclusion based preference criterion is used, the most
preferred models of the extension contain have(BMW) and convertible which are therefore
consequences of the choice default theory. In general, the conclusions obtained this way
describe what is true in the most desired worlds which are considered plausible.
9. Discussion
We proposed in this paper a new nonmonotonic propositional logic for representing
ranked options. The logic has a new connective called ordered disjunction. Since ordered
disjunction is fully embedded in the language, the ranking of the options may depend on
the particular context, that is, it may depend on what else is true in the current situation.
We investigated computational aspects of QCL and showed how sets of formulas can
be translated to stratified knowledge bases and, by results in [5], to classical propositional
knowledge bases. We indicated a number of potential applications of the logic, and we
presented alternative definitions of the consequence relation for applications where the
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lexicographic ordering based on the number of best possible options is not adequate.
Moreover, we investigated the relationship between QCL on one hand and circumscription
respectively possibilistic logic on the other. We also proposed a combination of QCL and
Reiter’s default logic.
In the next subsection we clarify the role of formulas in QCL. We then discuss related
work.
9.1. Beliefs and desires in QCL
The reader will have noticed that in QCL there is no syntactic distinction between
formulas representing beliefs and formulas representing desires or intentions. For the
applications discussed in Section 4 this did not pose any problems. In contexts where the
distinction is important it may be useful (and necessary to avoid wishful thinking, see [36])
to split the premises T into two subsets, a set K of classical formulas representing beliefs
about the real world and a set D of QCL formulas representing desires.
We call BD = (K,D) where K is a set of propositional formulas and D a set of QCL
formulas a belief-desire theory. For simplicity, we will assume that D is in normal form,
that is D = {F1, . . . ,Fn} where Fi = Ci,1 ×· · · ×Ci,ki . Let S be a set of classical formulas.
A classical formula F is called BD-belief iff K  F . F is called conditional desire given S
iff ∨
M∈Pref (S∪D)
∧
1in
Ci,degM(Fi)  F.
Here Pref (S ∪ D) denotes the preferred models of S ∪ D, degM(Fi) is the satisfaction
degree of Fi in M . The disjunction used here can be viewed as a representation of the
desires which can be satisfied in the most preferred models satisfying S.
An unconditional desire is a conditional desire given ∅. A BD-desire is a conditional
desire given K . Obviously, each belief and each BD-desire is a QCL consequence of K∪D.
Using this terminology it is possible to explain the behaviour of a “flat” QCL theory
T which does not distinguish between beliefs and desires. Let BDT = (KT ,DT ) be
an arbitrary partition of T into beliefs and desires. Then there are three categories of
conclusions of T : beliefs, BDT -desires, and “mixed” formulas containing, for instance,
conjunctions of beliefs and desires. Moving a classical formula from D to K , or vice versa,
may change the category of a conclusion, but never the set of conclusions. Thus, whenever
it is unimportant to distinguish between beliefs and desires in the conclusions flat QCL can
be used.
9.2. Related work
Preference handling in nonmonotonic reasoning and logic programming has received
considerable attention in recent years. For an overview of some of the existing approaches
see the discussion in [12] or the more recent [33]. Only few approaches allow for context
dependent preferences. Existing work on context dependent preferences in nonmonotonic
logics is based on explicit representations of a preference ordering together with names
for default rules and sophisticated reformulations of the acceptable belief sets [9,10] or
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makes heavy use of meta-predicates and compilation techniques [15,20]. The availability
of ordered disjunction in QCL allows context dependent preferences among properties of
a problem solution to be expressed much more conveniently.
QCL is also closely related to approaches in qualitative decision making [17]. Poole [31]
aims at a combination of logic and decision theory. His approach incorporates quantitative
utilities whereas our preferences are qualitative. Interestingly, Poole uses a logic without
disjunction (“rather than using disjunction . . . we want to use probability and decision
theory to handle uncertainty”, Section 1.5) whereas we enhance disjunction.
In [8] CP-networks are introduced, together with corresponding algorithms. These
networks are a graphic representation, somewhat reminiscent of Bayes nets, for conditional
preferences among feature values under the ceteris paribus principle. Our approach differs
from CP-networks in at least two respects:
• Since ordered disjunction is fully embedded in the logic, we are able to represent more
general preferences. Preferences in CP-networks are always total orders of the possible
values of a variable.
• The ceteris paribus interpretation of preferences is different from our interpretation.
The former views the available preferences as (hard) constraints on a global preference
order. A set of QCL formulas, on the other hand, is more like a set of different criteria
in multi-criteria optimization. For example, the QCL theory{
A → (C × D),B → (D × C),A,B}
is not inconsistent. There is reason to prefer C over D, and reason to prefer D over C.
In QCL such conflicting preferences may neutralize each other, but do not lead to
inconsistency.
In a series of papers [22,23,37], originally motivated by [7], the authors propose viewing
conditional desires as constraints on utility functions. Intuitively, D(a|b) stands for:
the b-worlds with highest utility satisfy a. Our interpretation of ranked options is very
different. Rather than being based on decision theory our approach can be viewed as giving
a particular interpretation to the ceteris paribus principle: a model M1 is preferred over a
model M2 if there is a formula F ∈ T satisfied to degree j by M1 and to degree k > j by
M2 provided M1 satisfies the other formulas in T at least as well as M2. The last phrase
is made precise as follows: for each degree i  j M1 satisfies at least as many formulas in
T \ {F } as M2 to degree i .
Our work is also related to valued (sometimes also called weighted) constraint
satisfaction [6,18,19,34]. A classical constraint problem is given by a set of variables V , a
domain Dvi for each variable vi , and a set of constraints specifying conditions for solutions.
A solution is an assignment of values from the respective domain to the variables satisfying
all constraints.
A valued constraint, rather than specifying hard conditions, yields a ranking of
solutions. A global ranking of solutions then is obtained from the rankings provided by
the single constraints through some combination rule. In MAX-CSP [18], for instance,
constraints assign penalties to solutions and solutions with the lowest penalty sum are
G. Brewka et al. / Artificial Intelligence 157 (2004) 203–237 229
preferred. In fuzzy CSP [19] each solution is characterized by the worst violation of any
constraint. Preferred solutions are those where the worst violation is minimal.
Determining a preferred QCL model can be viewed as a valued constraint problem
where the variables are the atoms, the domains are the truth values, solutions are models,
and the valued constraints are expressed as QCL formulas. It is a topic of further research
whether combination rules used in constraint satisfaction have interesting applications in
QCL, and vice versa.
In future work we want to investigate combinations of QCL and existing product
configuration methodologies, e.g., [35], extensions of the inference relation to non-
classical formulas, and the first order case. An application of the ideas underlying QCL
to answer set programming is described in [11], an implementation of this approach based
on the answer set solver Smodels is described in [13].
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Appendix A. Proofs of propositions
This appendix contains proofs of Propositions 2, 6, 8, 9, 10 and 11 and proofs of
Lemmas 4 and 6. A few additional lemmas are proven which turn out to be useful for
the main proofs. The proofs of Lemmas 1–3 and Proposition 1 are straightforward by
induction on the structure of formula F and are therefore omitted. Proofs of Propositions 3
and 4 follow from Proposition 8 and the well-known properties of the lexicographic
systems. Proposition 7 is a corollary of Propositions 2 and 6. Proposition 5 is a corollary
of Proposition 7 and results in [5].
Fact 1. Let F1,F2 be two arbitrary choice formulas. Let I be an interpretation, and k  1
be such that I |=k F1. Then we also have: I |=k F1 × F2.
Proof of Proposition 2 (Ordered disjunction is associative). First, it easy to check that
the two formulas ((F1 × F2) × F3) and (F1 × (F2 × F3)) have the same optionality,
namely:
opt
(
(F1 × F2) × F3
)= opt(F1 × (F2 × F3))= opt(F1)+ opt(F2)+ opt(F3).
Let I be an interpretation, let us consider different cases of satisfaction of the formulas Fi
by I :
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• I |=k F1 then using Fact 1, we have I |=k F1 × F2, and again applying Fact 1, we get
I |=k (F1 × F2) × F3.
On the other hand, using Fact 1, we also have: I |=k F1 × (F2 × F3).
• I |=1 ¬F1 and I |=k F2. Then by definition, we have I |=k+opt(F1) F1 × F2, and
applying Fact 1, we get I |=k+opt(F1) (F1 × F2) × F3.
On the other hand, using Fact 1, we also have: I |=k F2 × F3, and by definition
I |=k+opt(F1) F1 × (F2 × F3).• I |=1 ¬F1, I |=1 ¬F2 and I |=k F3. Then by definition, we have I |=1 ¬(F1 × F2),
and I |=k+opt(F1)+opt(F2) (F1 × F2) × F3.
On the other hand, we also have: I |=k+opt(F2) F2 × F3, and I |=k+opt(F1)+opt(F2)
F1 × (F2 × F3).
• I |=1 ¬F1, I |=1 ¬F2 and I |=1 ¬F3. Then by definition, we have I |=1 ¬((F1 ×F2) ×
F3) and I |=1 ¬(F1 × (F2 × F3)). 
Proof of Proposition 6 (Strong equivalences of formulas without ×). For the three
equivalences, it is easy to check the equality of the optionality of the equivalent formulas.
(1) We assume for the sake of simplicity, and without loss of generality, that m n. The
equivalence becomes:
(A1 × · · · × An)∨ (B1 × · · · ×Bm) .= (A1 ∨B1) × · · · × (An ∨Bn)
where for i > m, Bi = ⊥ (since Ai is classically equivalent to Ai ∨ ⊥).
Let us consider different cases of satisfaction of Ai ’s and Bj ’s by I .
• There exists i > 0 and j > 0 such that I |= ¬A1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Ai−1 ∧ Ai and I |=
¬B1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Bj−1 ∧Bj .
This implies that:
– for k < min(i, j), I |= ¬(Ak ∨Bk), and for n k min(i, j): I |= Ak ∨Bk ,
– I |=i A1 × · · · ×An,
– I |=j B1 × · · · × Bm.
This leads by definition to:
I |=min(i,j) (A1 × · · · ×An)∨ (B1 × · · · × Bm), and
I |=min(i,j) (A1 ∨B1) × · · · × (An ∨Bn).
• ∀i  n, I |= ¬Ai and there exists j > 0 such that I |= ¬B1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Bj−1 ∧ Bj .
This implies that:
I |= ¬(A1 ∨ B1)∧ · · · ∧ ¬(Aj−1 ∨ Bj−1)∧ (Aj ∨ Bj) ∧ · · · ∧ (An ∨Bn),
I |=1 ¬(A1 × · · · ×An),
I |=j B1 × · · · ×Bm.
Hence by definition, we get:
I |=j (A1 × · · · × An)∨ (B1 × · · · ×Bm), and
I |=j (A1 ∨B1) × · · · × (An ∨ Bn).
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• ∀i  n, I |= ¬Ai , and ∀j  m,I |= ¬Bj . This implies that: ∀i  n, I |= ¬(Ai ∨
Bi). Hence: I |=1 ¬(A1 × · · · × An) ∨ (B1 × · · · × Bm), and I |=1 ¬((A1 ∨ B1) ×
· · · × (An ∨Bn)).
(2) Again, we assume for the sake of simplicity, and without loss of generality, that m n.
The equivalence becomes:
(A1 × · · · × An)∧ (B1 × · · · ×Bm) .= (C1 × · · · × Cn)
where Ci = [(A1 ∨ · · · ∨Ai) ∧Bi ] ∨ [Ai ∧ (B1 ∨ · · · ∨Bi)], and Bi = ⊥ for m< i .
Let us consider different cases of satisfaction of Ai ’s and Bj ’s by I .
• There exists i > 0 and j > 0 such that I |= ¬A1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Ai−1 ∧ Ai and I |=
¬B1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Bj−1 ∧Bj .
This implies that:
– for k < max(i, j), I |= ¬Ci , and for n k max(i, j), I |= Ck ,
– I |=i A1 × · · · ×An,
– I |=j B1 × · · · × Bm.
This leads by definition to:
I |=max(i,j) (A1 × · · · × An)∧ (B1 × · · · ×Bm), and
I |=max(i,j) C1 × · · · ×Cn.
• ∀i  n, I |= ¬Ai , or ∀j m,I |= ¬Bj . This implies that: ∀i  n, I |= ¬Ci . Hence:
I |=1 ¬
[
(A1 × · · · × An)∧ (B1 × · · · ×Bm)
]
, and
I |=1 ¬[C1 × · · · ×Cn].
(3) I |= ¬(A1 ∨ · · · ∨An) iff ∀0 i  n, I |= ¬Ai
iff I |=1 ¬(A1 ∨ · · · ∨ An) iff I |=1 ¬(A1 × · · · ×An). 
Proof of Proposition 8 (Sketch). T |∼F iff Skb(T ) lex F .
Let Skb(T ) = S = (T ∗, T1, . . . , Tn) be the stratified base associated with T . In the
following, M1 and M2 denote two models of T . |Mp1 (T )| and |Mp2 (T )| denote the
number of simple choice logic formulas from T satisfied to a degree p by M1 and M2,
respectively. In a similar way, |Mp1 (S)| and |Mp2 (S)| denote the number of propositional
formulas from Tp satisfied by M1 and M2, respectively. The idea of the proof is to show
that the lexicographic ordering between models of T which is based on the number of
satisfied choice formulas from T is the same as the one based on the number of satisfied
propositional formulas from Skb(T ).
Fact 2. |M11 (S)| |M12 (S)| iff |M11 (T )| |M12 (T )|.
Given, this fact, the proof of Proposition 8 follows immediately by applying iteratively
the following lemma:
Lemma 8. Let us assume that:
∀j = 1, . . . , i, ∣∣Mj1 (T )∣∣= ∣∣Mj2 (T )∣∣ iff ∣∣Mj1 (S)∣∣= ∣∣Mj2 (S)∣∣.
Then:
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• |Mi+1(T )| = |Mi+1(T )| if and only if |Mi+1(S)| = |Mi+1(S)|, and1 2 1 2
• |Mi+11 (T )| > |Mi+12 (T )| if and only if |Mi+11 (S)| > |Mi+12 (S)|.
Proof. We will only show the first item. The other case follows similarly by replacing the
symbol = by >.
First note that:∣∣Mi1(S)∣∣+ ∣∣Mi+11 (T )∣∣
= ∣∣{A1 × · · · × An ∈ T : M1 |= A1 ∨ · · · ∨Ai, and n i + 1}∣∣
+ ∣∣{A1 × · · · ×An ∈ T : M1 |= ¬A1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Ai ∧Ai+1, and n i + 1}∣∣
= ∣∣{A1 × · · · × An ∈ T : M1 |= A1 ∨ · · · ∨Ai ∨Ai+1, and n i + 1}∣∣.
Hence:
(1)
∣∣Mi+11 (S)∣∣= ∣∣Mi1(S)∣∣+ ∣∣Mi+11 (T )∣∣− ∣∣T i+1∣∣
where T i+1 = {A1 × · · · ×An ∈ T : n = i + 1}.
It is clear that any model M of T satisfies A1 ∨ · · · ∨An where A1 × · · · ×An ∈ T i+1.
Given (1) the proof follows straightforwardly. Indeed,
• if |Mi1(S)| = |Mi2(S)| and |Mi+11 (T )| = |Mi+12 (T )| then using (1) we also have
|Mi+11 (S)| = |Mi+12 (S)|;
• if |Mi1(S)| = |Mi2(S)| and |Mi+11 (S)| = |Mi+12 (S)| then using again (1) we also have
|Mi+11 (T )| = |Mi+12 (T )|. 
Proof of Proposition 9 (Sketch). T |∼incF iff Skb(T ) inc F .
In the following, Mp1 (T ) and M
p
2 (T ) denote the set of simple choice logic formulas
from T satisfied to a degree p by M1 and M2, respectively. In a similar way, Mp1 (S)
and Mp2 (S) denote the set of propositional formulas from Ti satisfied by M1 and M2,
respectively. We define Skb-inclusion-preference between models of T exactly like in
Definition 13, by replacing Mj1 (T ) and M
j
2 (T ) by M
j
1 (S) and M
j
2 (S), respectively. The
idea of the proof is then to show that the T -inclusion-based ordering coincides with Skb-
inclusion-based ordering. We first give two facts and show a lemma.
Fact 3. If M |=k A1 × · · · ×An then for any j = k, . . . , n we have M |= A1 ∨ · · · ∨Aj .
Fact 4. If M |= A1 ∨ · · · ∨Aj then there exists some k  j such that M |=k A1 × · · · ×An.
Lemma 9. If there exists some k such that for all j = 1, . . . , k we have Mj1 (T ) = Mj2 (T )
then for all j = 1, . . . , k we have Mj1 (S) = Mj2 (S). The converse is also true.
Proof.
• Assume that for all j = 1, . . . , k we have
M
j
1 (T ) = Mj2 (T ) (A.1)
and there exists some i  k such that Mi1(S) 
= Mi2(S).
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Let A1 ∨ · · · ∨Ai be a formula in Si satisfied by M1 but falsified by M2. Using Fact 4,
we have M1 |=j A1 × · · · ×An from some j  i . Using the hypothesis (1) this implies
that M2 |=j A1 × · · · × An. Applying Fact 3, we get M2 |= A1 ∨ · · · ∨Ai and hence a
contradiction.
• The other direction follows the same schema. Namely, assume that for all j = 1, . . . , k
we have
M
j
1 (S) = Mj2 (S) (A.2)
and there exists some i  k such that Mi1(T ) 
= Mi2(T ).
Let A1 × · · · × An be a formula in T satisfied by M1 to a degree i but is not satisfied
by M2 to a degree i . Using Fact 3, we get M1 |= A1 ∨ · · · ∨ Ai (and by definition for
k < i , M1 
|= A1 ∧ · · · ∧ Ak). Hypothesis (2) implies M2 |= A1 ∨ · · · ∨ Ai . Applying
Fact 4, we get M2 |=k A1 × · · · × An for some k  i , hence a contradiction. 
Given this lemma, we have.
Lemma 10. M1 is Skb-inclusion-preferred to M2 iff M1 is T-inclusion-preferred to M2.
Proof.
• Let M1 be Skb-inclusion-preferred to M2 but M1 is not T -inclusion-preferred to M2.
By definition, M1 is Skb-inclusion-preferred to M2 implies that there exists some i
such that for all j < i we have Mj1 (S) = Mj2 (S) and Mi2(S) ⊂ Mi1(S). From Lemma 5,
we also get: for all j < i we have Mj1 (T ) = Mj2 (T ).
Moreover, Mi2(S) ⊂ Mi1(S) means that there exists a formula A1 ∨ · · · ∨ Ai which is
satisfied by M1 but not by M2. This means that there exists a choice logic formula
A1 × · · · × An which is satisfied to degree i by M1 but not by M2 (which means that
Mi2(T ) is not included in M
i
1(T )).
Now, assume that there exists a simple choice logic formula A1 × · · · × An which
is satisfied by M2 to a degree i but not by M1. From Fact 3, this implies that
M2 |= A1 ∨ · · · ∨ Ai , which implies M1 |= A1 ∨ · · · ∨ Ai (since Mi2(S) ⊂ Mi1(S))
and this contradicts the fact that A1 × · · · × An is not satisfied by M1 to a degree i .
• The proof is symmetric. Let M1 be T -inclusion-preferred to M2 but M1 is not Skb-
inclusion-preferred to M2. By definition, M1 is Incl-T -preferred to M2 implies that
there exists some i such that for all j < i we have Mj1 (T ) = Mj2 (T ) and Mi2(T ) ⊂
Mi1(T ). From Lemma 5, we also get: for all j < i we have M
j
1 (S) = Mj2 (S).
Moreover, Mi2(T ) ⊂ Mi1(T ) means that there exists a simple choice logic formula
A1 × · · · × An which is satisfied to a degree i by M1 but not by M2. This means that
there exists a propositional formula A1 ∨ · · · ∨ Ai in Si which is satisfied by M1 but
not by M2 (which means that Mi2(S) is not included in Mi1(S)).
Now, assume that there exists a formula A1 ∨ · · · ∨ Ai in Si which is satisfied by
M2 but not by M1. Using Fact 4, this implies that M2 |=i A1 × · · · × An, which
implies M1 |=i A1 × · · · × An (since Mi2(T ) ⊂ Mi1(T )) and this contradicts the fact
that A1 ∨ · · · ∨ Ai is not satisfied by M1. 
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Proof of Proposition 10 (Representing circumscription in QCL). We first observe that T
and T ′ have exactly the same models since the propositional counterpart of each formula in
T ′ \T (obtained by replacing × with ∨) is a tautology. Now assume M is not <V1,...,Vn;W -
preferred. Then there exists a model M ′ of T and an i such that M ′ agrees with M on
atoms in W and on atoms in V1, . . . , Vi−1 and makes fewer atoms in Vi true than M . Thus
the formulas in T ′ \T satisfied to degree 1, . . . , n− 1 by M ′ are the same as those satisfied
to degree 1, . . . , n − 1 by M . Moreover, M ′ satisfies a superset of those satisfied by M to
degree i and thus M is not an inclusion preferred model of T ′.
Conversely, let M be a non-preferred model of T ′. Then there is a model M ′ and an i
such that the formulas in T ′ \ T satisfied to degree i by M ′ are a superset of those satisfied
to degree i by M , and those satisfied to any degree j < i by the two models coincide. Since
changing the truth value of a variable in W always changes the satisfaction degree of some
formula in T ′ from 1 to 2, M and M ′ agree on atoms in W and there must be a variable in
Vi false in M ′ and true in M . Since all variables in Vi which are false in M are also false
in M ′, it follows that M is not <V1,...,Vn;W -preferred. 
Proof of Proposition 11 (Representing QCL in circumscription). The proof is based on
the following
Lemma 11. Let Fi,k denote the kth ordered disjunct of formula Fi ∈ T . If M is a model of
T , then M ′ = M ∪ {abi,h | h j,M |=j Fi} is a model of T ′. Vice versa, if M ′ is a model
of T ′, then M ′ \ AB1 ∪ · · · ∪ ABn is a model of T .
To prove the lemma consider a model M of T . M satisfies each formula Fi to some
degree j . Implications (1), . . . , (j − 1) of the translation of Fi are satisfied in M ′ because
M ′ contains abi,1, . . . ,abi,j−1. Implication (j) is satisfied because M and thus M ′ satisfies
Fi,j . Implications (k) for k > j are satisfied because M ′ does not contain abi,j .
Conversely, let M ′ be a model of T ′, Fj a formula in T with optionality m + 1. M ′
contains an arbitrary subset S (possibly empty) of {abj,1, . . . ,abj,m}. S satisfies at least
one of the preconditions of the implications obtained from translating Fj and thus the
consequent of the implication which is one of the options of Fj . Since Fj does not contain
any of the new ab-atoms it follows that M satisfies Fj . This concludes the proof of the
lemma.
Now assume M1 is a non-preferred model of T , that is, there is a model M2 inclusion
preferred over M1. Let j be the smallest satisfaction degree at which the two models differ,
and let Fm be a formula satisfied to degree j in M2, but not in M1.
Consider a model M ′1 of T ′ such that M ′1 \AB1 ∪ · · · ∪ABn = M1. Let M ′2 be the model
of T ′ constructed from M2 according to the lemma. Since M1 and M2 agree on formulas
satisfied to any degree smaller than j and M2 satisfies more formulas to degree j we have,
for each h  j , abr,h ∈ M ′2 implies abr,h ∈ M ′1. Moreover, since M ′1 must contain abm,j
whereas M ′2 does not, it is straightforward to show that M ′2 <AB1,...,ABn;∅ M ′1.
Conversely, assume M1 is a maximally preferred model of T . Let M ′1 be the model
of T ′ obtained through the construction in the lemma. We show by contradiction that
M ′1 is maximally <AB1,...,ABn;∅-preferred. Assume for some model M ′2 of T ′ we have
M ′2 <AB1,...,ABn;∅ M ′1. Since every model different from M ′1 which agrees with M ′1 on
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atoms in T must contain more abi,j literals than M ′ , M ′ cannot agree with M ′ on atoms in1 2 1
T . Using the lemma we thus have that M2 = M ′2 \AB1 ∪· · ·∪ABn is a model of T different
from M1. Let j be the smallest index such that, for some k, abk,j is false in M ′2 but true in
M ′1. M2 satisfies all formulas F ∈ T with degM1(F ) j with a degree at least as good as
M1. Moreover, M2 satisfies Fk at least to degree j whereas M1 does not. Therefore M2 is
inclusion preferred to M1, contrary to our assumption.
We thus have for each maximally inclusion preferred model of T a corresponding model
of T ′ agreeing on F and vice versa. 
Proof of Lemma 4 (Possibility distribution associated with ∆⊕). We only show the case
where two ∆-knowledge bases are merged. The general case follows in a similar way.
Recall that
π∆⊕ =
{[
φi ∧ψj ,⊕(αi , βj )
]
: [φi,αi ] ∈ ∆1 and [ψj ,βj ] ∈ ∆2
}
.
Note first that if for some interpretation I , π1(I) = 0 or π2(I) = 0 then this means
that I falsifies all propositional formulas of ∆1, or I falsifies all propositional formulas
of ∆2. Hence, I also falsifies all propositional formulas of ∆⊕. Then, π∆⊕ = 0 =
⊕(π1(I), . . . , πn(I)), since ⊕(0,0) = 0.
Now assume that I satisfies at least one propositional formula from ∆1 and at least one
propositional formula from ∆2. Then π∆⊕ is computed as follows:
π∆⊕(I) = max
{⊕(αi , βj ): I |= φi ∧ ψj and [φi ∧ψj ,⊕(αi , βj )] ∈ ∆⊕}
= max{⊕(αi , βj ): I |= φi ∧ ψj and [φi,αi] ∈ ∆1, [ψj ,βj ] ∈ ∆2}
= max{⊕(αi , βj ): I |= φi, [φi,αi ] ∈ ∆1 and I |= ψj , [ψj ,βj ] ∈ ∆2}.
Since ⊕ satisfies the unanimity condition then when αi and βj are maximal then ⊕(αi , βj )
is also maximal.
Hence,
π∆⊕(I) = ⊕
(
max
{
αi : I |= φi, [φi,αi ] ∈ ∆1
}
,max
{
βj : I |= ψj , [ψj ,βj ] ∈ ∆2
})
= ⊕(π1(I),π2(I)).
Proof of Lemma 6 (Basic choice formulas as ∆-knowledge bases). The proof is
immediate. Indeed, if for all i , I 
|= Ai , then from Definition 16 we have π(I) = 0, and from
Definition 3 we have I |=1 ¬F . Now, assume that I satisfies some Ai . Then π(I) = αk
means that I |= Ak , and for i = 1, . . . , k−1, we have I 
|= Ai , and this is exactly equivalent
to I |=k F . 
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